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Abstract
Cyber security risk assessments in the healthcare industry are legally required and
demand an ongoing investment of time and resources. Small healthcare clinics are less
likely to have streamlined processes in place to meet these requirements. This work
presents two case studies featuring qualitative Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) security risk assessments of small dental clinics using the
free Security Risk Assessment (SRA) tool provided by the US Department of Health and
Human Services. One clinic used a cloud service provider to safeguard protected health
information (PHI) while the other used an on-premises server. The data revealed
detailed information relating to the cyber risk posture of each organization within the
scope of the HIPAA Security Rule. Analysis included suggestions to mitigate the
compliance gaps and vulnerabilities within the environment. Based on the data
gathered, a comparative analysis of using the cloud vs. on-premises to manage PHI
was conducted to provide insight into the need to balance security with other business
requirements. This work provides greater context to the process of conducting HIPAAcompliant security risk assessments, including the responsibilities that small healthcare
providers must own to protect their business reputation in the event of a major security
incident.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
This work includes HIPAA security risk assessments of two small dental clinics
using the SRA tool provided by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
One clinic used a cloud service provider (CSP) to safeguard PHI and the other housed
PHI on-premises. A comparative analysis of the risks between the two clinics was
conducted which included an evaluation of the pros and cons of housing PHI in the
cloud. The final section includes an examination of key factors for small business
owners to consider based on emerging cyber security trends.
Problem Statement
Periodic risk assessments for all healthcare entities which use electronic PHI are
required under the HIPAA Security Rule as a subset of HIPAA compliance. Risk
assessments are time-consuming activities which require expertise and significant
attention to detail. These risks must then be managed and mitigated, as appropriate, in
a continuous improvement process.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Small healthcare clinics are often forgotten in the cyber security landscape and
typically do not have significant resources to invest in their security program. Yet small
businesses are a prime target for various cyberattacks which can compromise the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI. This research contributes to addressing
this resource problem by providing clear insight and direction into these competing
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challenges that small business owners face in the healthcare space based on some of
the most recent cyber security trends.
Objective of the Research
The objectives of this research are to help drive the HIPAA compliance
conversation forward and assist small healthcare entities with developing their cyber
security risk management programs.
Research Questions


How much time and effort does it take to complete a HIPAA risk assessment
using the SRA tool?



What are the key cyber security responsibilities that healthcare providers must
own to be HIPAA-compliant and maintain their reputation should a breach occur?



What should healthcare providers consider when deciding whether to house PHI
in the cloud or on-premises?

Limitations of the Research
The SRA tool is a guideline for risk assessments and its use does not guarantee
compliance. The scope of the tool is limited to the HIPAA Security Rule, which is a
subset of HIPAA compliance.
Definition of Terms


BAA: Business associate agreement. Contract between two businesses for
service provided, including liability and responsibilities should a breach or other
security incident occur.



Clinic A: Used a cloud service provider to house PHI.
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Clinic B: Housed PHI on-premises and included roughly six times more PHI
records than Clinic A.



CSP: Cloud service provider. Can be certified as HIPAA-compliant.



HHS: Department of Health and Human Services. They own the SRA tool,
provide guidance for HIPAA compliance, and administer HIPAA audits and fines.



HIPAA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. This law
governs compliance obligations for healthcare providers, which includes cyber
security.



PHI: Protected health information. Sensitive patient information protected by
HIPAA law.



Small healthcare provider: Less than 50 employees.



SRA tool: Security Risk Assessment tool, provided by HHS as a guideline for
HIPAA Security Rule compliance.

Summary
This research aims to provide small healthcare providers with clear guidance to
fully own the cyber security risks in their clinical environment. The case studies and
analysis provide examples of the level of detail and time commitment one should expect
should they opt to use the SRA tool.
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter provides greater context for the problem of conducting a HIPAA
security risk assessment in compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule. Literature related
to cyber risk management in healthcare is reviewed along with literature related to tools
which enhance or automate cyber risk management processes.
Background Related to the Problem
Risk assessments are an important method of validating the current state of a
cyber security program. Given that cyber security is regarded as an enterprise risk
management function, risk assessments encapsulate all components of an
organization’s security posture. Within the healthcare industry, PHI is some of the most
valuable data on the black market and the industry is highly regulated under HIPAA law.
HIPAA compliance includes, but is not limited to, the HIPAA Security Rule, HIPAA
Privacy Rule and HIPAA Enforcement Rule. Under the HIPAA Security Rule (HHS,
2003), healthcare entities are required to conduct periodic cyber security risk
assessments which focus on the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards
deployed within the enterprise. The HIPAA Privacy Rule relates to privacy regulations
and the HIPAA Enforcement Rule relates to the enforcement of HIPAA provisions. Over
the past several years, HHS has levied significant fines against healthcare providers
that were noncompliant with HIPAA statutes.
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Figure 1. The Cost of HIPAA Non-Compliance. (HIPAA Journal, 2015)
As Figure 1 shows, violations can result in fines as high as $1.5 million. Each PHI
record in a data breach is considered a violation, so this can add up very quickly for
organizations with many records exposed. Figures 2 and 3 show the most recent
breach data for 2016. In several cases, the fine exceeded $1.5 million which typically
involved multiple breaches or a long history of noncompliance. The largest HIPAA fine
to date was levied against Advocate Health Network for just over $5.5 million in August
2016. HHS has prosecuted violations against healthcare entities of all sizes.
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Figure 2. Summary of 2016 HIPAA Settlements (Part 1). (HIPAA Journal, 2017)
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Figure 3. Summary of 2016 HIPAA Settlements (Part 2). (HIPAA Journal, 2017)
Much of the attention with respect to cyber security in healthcare has gone to the
mid-sized and large providers. These entities typically have more financial and human
resources to devote to implementing security measures. With the overwhelming
responsibilities that small businesses face in trying to meet the needs of the business,
this work aims to address this well-known gap and demystify the cyber risk
management process. The review of literature will consider various efforts undertaken
by healthcare providers, with an emphasis on smaller providers, to improve their cyber
risk posture.
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Literature Related to the Problem
The federal government offers a few key resources to assist any small healthcare
clinic with cyber risk management and HIPAA compliance. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2014) is the current
broad industry standard used in both the public and private sectors. NIST also released
a framework specifically geared for small businesses, including small healthcare clinics.
(Paulsen & Toth, 2016) The Balridge Cybersecurity Excellence Builder (NIST, 2016) is a
self-assessment tool provided by NIST which improves the ability of organizations to
understand their cyber risk posture and take appropriate action. HHS provides
information specific to HIPAA compliance, including the HIPAA Security Rule. (HHS,
n.d.)
According to Morrissey (2017), "The demands of implementing an effective
security risk assessment are the most difficult for smaller urban or rural practices, which
typically have tight margins" (p. 39). Green, et al. (2015) specifically looked at managing
PHI for low monetary resource healthcare providers. They found that these entities are
critically lacking in in their ability to maintain a sound cyber risk posture and mentioned
that, for many of these providers, “ongoing support will be needed…to remain viable” (p.
17). Blanke & McGrady (2016) created a detailed list of recommendations for security
risk assessments based on the most recent data for healthcare data breaches. These
recommendations can be foundational for small providers to move forward with their
security programs.
Recent cyber risk management case studies have been administered in Canada
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(Desouza & Valverde, 2016), Turkey (Namoʇlu & Ülgen, 2014), and Iran (Zarei &
Sadoughi, 2016). Each of these cases involved medium or large healthcare
organizations, which further suggests this to be an area of need for small healthcare
providers in the United States. Lisbon & Rice (2017) used the SRA tool to assess a
small dental clinic which utilized a cloud service provider. The methodology and data set
from that work are core components of this expanded work.
Security education and awareness training is a key component of a healthcare
security program. Fernandez-Aleman, et al. (2015) found a lack of security education
and awareness training as well as communication of security expectations led to
security lapses in healthcare organizations. He & Johnson (2015) examined how to
better implement the lessons learned from security incidents compared with the typical
healthcare organization. Bai, et al. (2014) offered a decision-making methodology to
improve workflow processes and efficiencies related to cyber risk, attempting to tackle
the low-resource problem on the process level in healthcare. Wei, Lin & Loho-Noya
(2013) created a quantitative security risk assessment method with an emphasis on
managing the risk of PHI.
Enterprise cyber security issues were previously relegated to the IT domain and
budget. Andre (2017) makes clear that this outdated approach is untenable and
requires a strategic risk management-based approach to address the distinct
challenges in healthcare. Cascardo (2016) details numerous risk analysis and risk
management steps that healthcare organizations can take to meet compliance
obligations and reduce the likelihood of data breaches. Similar prescriptions are offered
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by Blass & Miller (2015), with specific recommendations for the creation and
maintenance of documentation, regular risk assessments, and appropriate training.
An important healthcare consideration is the inherent conflict of interest between
protecting the patient and protecting their data. In certain crisis situations, protecting the
patient may supersede protecting their data ethically and under the law. Kisekka (2016)
explored this topic in depth by examining the resilience of healthcare IT personnel in
their response to extreme healthcare events. She found that a well-prepared
organization is more likely to protect the patient in these situations while also
safeguarding their PHI, instead of having to make this compromise. This work should
give confidence to healthcare providers that a proactive approach to cyber security will
reap many benefits.
Continuous improvement is critical to building a resilient cyber security program.
The emerging industry standard is maturity, which measures the strength of a security
program at the business process level rather than simply checking the box for audit
compliance. (Veltsos, 2016) Other recent work (Molnar & Großmann, 2017) proposed a
maturity model which encapsulates four angles: tool support, risk assessment, testing,
and compliance. Security programs would receive a maturity rating of level 1-5 in each
of these areas, with 1 indicating little to no development and 5 indicating a significant
level of business processes in place. This type of approach paints a more complete
picture of the actual capabilities and processes of an organization’s program and
ensures that the leadership of the organization is continuously focused on the next level
of maturity that it aims to reach. For small clinics, this may involve just one or two
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individuals and can help to better understand the context of their responsibilities.
Contracts are an emerging cyber security priority, particularly with respect to
third-party vendors. Small organizations may have dozens of vendor relationships, while
large organizations likely have thousands. Travis & Schwartz (2017) indicate several
key areas to include in vendor contracts, including a notice and cooperation clause, a
cyber security practices clause, and a cyber liability insurance or indemnification clause.
Particularly if there is no insurance, they indicate indemnification clauses should be
placed separately since the cost of a data breach far exceeds standard indemnification
ceilings. Tschider (2016) recommends using standard language and strong contractual
terms when negotiating cyber security contracts with cloud service providers. Business
Associate Agreements (BAAs) are needed specifically for vendors that deal with PHI
directly. (Healthcare Risk Management, 2017)
Literature Related to the Methodology
The SRA tool (ONC, 2016) is owned by HHS and was collaboratively developed
by three of its sub-entities: The Office of the National Coordinator (ONC), Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) and Office of the General Counsel (OGC). According to HIMSS (2016),
the most recently updated version of the SRA tool streamlines the ability of small
healthcare providers to comply with the HIPAA Security Rule. In its literature, the ONC
makes clear that small healthcare providers are required to conduct HIPAA security risk
assessments and that it must be done in a thorough and professional manner. (ONC,
n.d.)
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Other tools exist in private industry which can supplement the SRA tool
functionality. The Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) offers a free information
sharing tool, Cyber Threat XChange (CTX), which offers automated threat management
for organizations of all sizes. (HITRUST, 2017) This gives healthcare organizations the
ability to strengthen their cyber risk posture irrespective of their maturity level.
Organizations can also use a free tool to benchmark third-party vendor cyber risks.
(CyberGRX, 2017) These results can then be fed into the SRA tool, which may be
useful given the complexity of managing third-party cyber risks.
Summary
As the data in this chapter revealed, healthcare providers have a strong incentive
to conduct risk assessments for the purposes of HIPAA compliance. Solutions for small
healthcare entities have generally been overlooked in the body of knowledge. This
allowed for the opportunity to conduct HIPAA security risk assessments using the SRA
tool that were specifically geared for this demographic.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
A qualitative risk assessment using the SRA tool was used. Information was
gathered in a detailed manner and methodically analyzed with respect to the HIPAA
Security Rule requirements
.Design of the Research
The research was conducted in a qualitative manner. While there were data
points to reference in the SRA tool, such as risk level and likelihood, these factors were
subjectively combined to determine whether the risk level is acceptable or must be
mitigated. The HHS website and its guidance within the tool helped to define terms and
provide context for what was needed.
Data Collection
Data was collected by interviewing the owner of each clinic to obtain detailed
answers to each of the questions within the SRA tool. (ONC, 2016) An experienced
security auditor was consulted early in the process to help guide it and ensure its
accuracy with current industry trends. Data was entered directly into the tool which later
produced a spreadsheet-based report with the fields of each question. Notes were also
taken and later consolidated to form the overall picture which will be described in the
Data Presentation & Analysis chapter.
Approximately 4-6 hours were spent with the owner of each clinic for the
assessment; the first assessment took significantly longer due to it being the first time
using the tool. The assessment included doing a physical walk-through of each site and
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asking follow-up questions about its configuration. With practice, the entire process of
gathering detailed, relevant data should take maybe 1-2 hours. Analyzing, integrating,
and presenting the data should take additional time for the assessor.
Data Analysis
The SRA tool consisted of 156 detailed questions and was run as an executable
file, which locally stored the data entries within the assessment data file. The context of
each question was geared towards protecting PHI through administrative policies,
physical access restrictions, or technical safeguards specific to the requirements laid
out in the HIPAA Security Rule. Appendix A contains the full list of SRA tool questions
for each of these areas.
The three types of questions were standard, required, and addressable. All
entities must comply with the standard and required questions. Addressable questions
would require an explanation for noncompliance along with documented alternative
measures, if appropriate. (ONC, 2016)
For each question, there were fields to detail current efforts, suggest appropriate
remediation steps, and mark the risk likelihood and impact. Questions could be flagged
for further review at a later time, there was a section for additional notes, and there was
a guidance area in the right pane to assist with answering the question. Figure 4
provides additional context.
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Figure 4. SRA Tool Question Sample
The questions were quite redundant throughout the assessment; it was
determined that, out of 156 questions, roughly 100 needed to be answered for the small
clinics in these cases. Small entities with one IT staff member, who may be the owner,
do not require the granularity of all 156 questions. Each question was qualitatively
addressed and compiled within the administrative, technical, and physical control
categories to present a clear picture of the cyber risk posture for each case.
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Summary
The SRA tool was adapted to fit the needs of these two cases. Overall, it served
its purpose by providing a clear guideline for HIPAA Security Rule compliance.
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
Information was gathered from the two clinics using the SRA tool. Once
collected, the information was synthesized and consolidated into a coherent set of data
which is presented in this chapter. This chapter also features an analysis of the security
gaps uncovered by each assessment as well as a comparative analysis between using
the cloud to safeguard PHI vs. housing PHI on-premises.
Data Presentation
As data was entered into the SRA tool during each assessment, it saved the
answers and later presented them as a spreadsheet report as shown in Figure 5 (use 22.5x zoom):

Figure 5. SRA Tool Spreadsheet Report
To protect anonymity and preserve space, only samples of the actual data in the
SRA tool report are presented in this example. The full data sets will be revealed in this
section. Clinic A was initially assessed by Lisbon & Rice (2017); its data presentation is
paraphrased in the subsequent sub-section.
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It should be noted that Clinic A demonstrated a significantly more mature risk
posture than Clinic B. For this reason, the presentation of the data for each clinic varies.
Clinic A features more granular detail that correlates more closely to the specific
questions of the SRA tool while Clinic B gives a clear picture with some specificity of its
relevant cyber security activities. The data analysis will more closely analyze the gaps
within Clinic B which reveal its lack of maturity. The concept of maturity in cyber security
will be analyzed further in the Discussion chapter.
Case Study: Clinic A. Clinic A employed five people and used eight stationary
computing devices. It was responsible for roughly 1,600 patient PHI records. The owner
remotely managed the computing environment as needed using a virtual private
network (VPN) from home; they had no dedicated IT personnel, so the owner took on all
IT and security-related responsibilities. Clinic A used a CSP to safeguard PHI, which
effectively transferred a large portion of risk to the CSP for managing it. The clinic owner
reported that the cloud architecture itself was HIPAA-compliant, as was the BAA
between the entities. It was found that the owner of Clinic A was quite organized with
respect to many of the responsibilities outlined in the SRA tool, which will now be
detailed according to what the owner reported during the assessment.
Clinic A took many actions in the area of administrative controls. The clinic
clearly stated the name of its security point-of-contact in its BAAs related to accessing
PHI and handled PHI in a similar manner to financial records such that a reasonable
level of security of PHI was maintained. A list of all BAAs was maintained, and they had
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an attorney review and sign off on the language of all BAAs. The BAA between the
clinic and CSP included termination procedures as well as the handling of PHI.
With regards to employee hiring procedures, Clinic A would only hire dentalcertified individuals after performing a thorough criminal background check. When an
employee was terminated, they would promptly disable the user’s logon access and
delete the employee’s physical access codes to the building. Their employee handbook
served as a guideline for job descriptions in the practice. The handbook included
language which explicitly forbade violation of the office PHI policy, which would result in
employee termination. Employees also performed cleaning duties.
Clinic A performed segregation of duties with its PHI processes, where possible,
including with the processing of cash payments. The clinic owner implemented various
levels of access control within the local computing environment as well as the CSP
environment with an emphasis on implementing role-based access and least privilege.
The owner had full administrative access while the office manager had access to most
administrative functions, except for adding and removing users. Other clinical personnel
had strictly role-based access for their jobs, including clinical notes and health histories
but no other PHI. It is notable that there existed billing codes within the CSP database
that abstracted unnecessary PHI details based on access level, which effectively
accounted for an additional layer of access control in the day-to-day functioning of the
business.
The owner proactively managed both environments in consultation with the CSP
to maximize functionality while ensuring there were appropriate access controls on all
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electronic devices to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of PHI. Within the clinic
environment, this included system reviews, multiple firewalls, operating system updates
to all devices, and regular password resets.
Many of the HIPAA Security Rule requirements for technical controls were
implemented within the CSP interface. The CSP interface encrypted PHI data at rest
and in transit. It had an auto-logoff policy for idle users, which paired with the clinic’s
auto-logoff policy of 4-6 hours to meet this requirement. The owner followed the CSP’s
recommendations for security settings within the CSP interface and paired these with
practical technical controls in the local environment. The CSP performed regular data
backups and maintained an extremely high availability of the service. This meant a
service outage was unlikely and the clinic owner determined this was an acceptable
business risk. Clinic A did not use shared accounts for any business function and
maintained a secure list of authorized users and passwords.
Overall, Clinic A effectively complied with physical security requirements. They
used an internal security system which included motion alarms and locks. The system
was periodically tested to confirm it was in working order. A third-party security firm
managed the protection of the facilities and equipment; the clinic had a BAA with this
entity. Clinic employees had free access to the facility during employment. If a breach
occurred after hours when the doors were locked, a security team would be promptly
dispatched in response.
The owner proactively maintained a Facility User Access List which included
active employees as well as accountants who had 1099 form access, but no facility
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access. The facility itself was designed to avoid scenarios where a casual passerby
could view PHI on clinic devices and the front desk computer was always monitored by
staff personnel. Clinic A also maintained an inventory of devices containing PHI and
ensured that any physical security measures implemented occurred with minimal impact
to the business.
Case Study: Clinic B. Clinic B employed 12 people and used 15 stationary
devices. It was responsible for protecting roughly 10,000 PHI records. These records
were housed on a desktop device running Windows 7 through the Patterson EagleSoft
user interface. Although the device ran a desktop version of Windows, it is otherwise
referenced as a server in this work since it provided PHI services for the clinic. The
clinic owner was the only individual with logon access to the device and managed it by
remotely connecting to it over a VPN as needed. A previous IT contractor set up the
entire system which served as a single point of failure for the entire clinic. The clinic
owner estimated a daily loss of $8,000 per day if the device stopped working. The
owner was unaware of how the device was set up and has consulted EagleSoft, as
needed, to keep it running. The owner ran two sets of regular data backups from the
device: one went to a cloud backup provider and the other to an external hard drive
stored in the office. Clinic personnel were able to send secure HIPAA-compliant email
containing PHI out of the EagleSoft interface using a specific version of Microsoft Office.
Clinic devices had web browsers installed with free internet access.
Clinic B had an employee handbook, employee termination policies, and BAAs
with some, but not all, of its key vendors. They implemented segregation of duties
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through receipt of cash payments. Employees were granted role-based access within
EagleSoft to only what they needed for their job and clinic devices were managed by
the owner with least privilege in mind. A couple of examples of this were that most clinic
devices did not have rights to print and employee system access was terminated before
they received official termination notice. The clinic owner periodically reviewed and
scanned the devices for vulnerabilities to see if there was anything obvious to eliminate
from them. The clinic did not use shared accounts and auto-logoff policies existed both
within the EagleSoft interface as well as on each clinic device. This ensured that free
access to PHI did not exist if a device was left unmonitored.
The clinic contracted with a security company to respond to security alarms after
hours. Its internal security system featuring motion alarms and locks had been tested.
The facility allowed free access which included the use of open bays. These bays
allowed for limited viewing of PHI on a nearby device if another patient was in the area.
Other clinic devices were not out in the open or clearly visible to patients walking by.
The clinic did not use mobile devices.
Data Analysis
Based on the answers from the assessment and current cyber security
knowledge, various gaps were identified and are qualitatively analyzed further in the
Gaps Analysis sub-section. The Comparative Analysis sub-section examines some of
the critical factors for each clinic to consider as well as the pros and cons of a cloudbased approach to protecting PHI. Similar to the previous section, the gaps analysis
involving Clinic A is paraphrased. (Lisbon & Rice, 2017)
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Gaps Analysis. During the assessments, various gaps in the security posture of
both clinics emerged. Most prominently was the lack of documentation in numerous
areas where the respective owners attested compliance as well as numerous other
areas of noncompliance.
Documentation is a critical area that HHS demands for HIPAA compliance. If a
security incident occurs and there is no documentation to validate an existing process,
HHS will regard the entity to be noncompliant. For both clinics, nearly 40% of the
questions answered within the SRA tool indicated documentation shortcomings. Both
clinic owners performed most of the cyber security processes on an ad hoc basis
without proper documentation. The creation and maintenance of documentation is
needed in the three HIPAA Security Rule areas of administrative, technical, and
physical controls. The following paragraphs spell out an exhaustive list of
documentation needs for both healthcare entities.
With regards to administrative documentation, both clinic owners must formally
document a security plan and the results from this risk assessment. They should
formally document a program to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to PHI that were
mentioned in this risk assessment and classify the risks as high, moderate, or low. Each
clinic owner should document their full list of duties as the security point-of-contact.
Each clinic needs to create policies and procedures to assess and manage risk
to PHI. In these policies, each practice must describe how its risk management program
prevents PHI exposure. Both clinics will need a written policy which explains how they
grant role-based access to clinical personnel and business associates. There must be a
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policy to explicitly grant access to PHI to those who need it and deny access to others.
Within the employee handbook, they should ensure it uses formal termination language,
review the termination language for misusing PHI, and include an Acceptable Use
section with language about devices being monitored and tracked. Both clinics should
create security training documentation that includes sanction policies, how malware can
get into systems, and good practices to follow to protect PHI.
Both clinics need to put together a Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) and
Contingency Plan (CP) for emergency situations that may arise. The CP should include
how PHI will be handled should a local server or CSP failure occur. Each owner should
evaluate when it would be practical to test the CP and document these tests. This
includes identifying and assessing the criticality of information systems applications and
how PHI would be accessed and stored during the implementation of the CP.
Each clinic should perform several administrative tasks on at least an annual
basis. Periodic employee training regarding information security threats to PHI and
periodic review of risk assessment policies and procedures should occur. BAA contract
language should be reviewed to affirm HIPAA compliance, the CP should be tested, and
the employee handbook should be updated as appropriate.
Technical documentation needs to be created by both clinics. They must
document their identity verification procedures for an individual who seeks access to
PHI as well as their definition of emergencies that are the most likely and have the
greatest business impact. These emergency scenarios will drive the DRP and CP
documents. Both clinics must also maintain an inventory and location record of all
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workstation devices; document employee facility and workstation access; and document
the regular review and update of physical security and environmental vulnerabilities.
Physical documentation must include each owner’s use of remote access to the
facility computing environment, how the positioning of workstations limits unauthorized
viewing of PHI, and security procedures for the secure storage and destruction of PHI
data. It must also include procedures for the protection of keys, combinations, and other
physical access controls. Any modifications or repairs to physical security features must
also be documented.
Multiple technical gaps exist within each clinic and will now be addressed in
further detail. Both clinics should implement a USB restriction policy on clinic devices.
Given that individuals have free facility access during business hours, such a policy
should be carefully considered along with its business impact on the appropriate
devices. To avoid internet-based threats, both clinics should consider implementing IP
whitelisting on clinic machines to avoid web application-based attacks from Internet
surfing. Group Policy implementation, web filtering, or virtual machine deployment could
also accomplish or supplement efforts towards this goal. Another option is to look at
setting up virtual local area networks (VLANs) on the local clinic network where each
device would be segregated. This would deter an internet-based intrusion on one device
from affecting other devices.
Given that both clinics use network print-fax devices which commonly receive
faxed PHI over plain old telephone service (POTS), each print-fax device is vulnerable
to physical memory intrusions and internet-based intrusions. Cable locks on these
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devices can help prevent this memory from being stolen and VLANs can segment these
devices to prevent a compromise should an attacker gain control of another internetconnected office device.
Gaps: Clinic A. The most obvious gap for Clinic A was its use of single-factor
authentication over the internet when connecting to the CSP to access PHI records.
Most responsible healthcare providers have already moved to multifactor authentication,
and Clinic A should initiate conversations with the CSP to make this happen. Passwords
are considered weak security over the internet, and this action would likely decrease the
liability for the clinic should a breach occur.
Clinic A also had a process gap when it received emails containing PHI. In these
situations, they should take special measures to record the information while not
retransmitting it over the internet. Replies to emails contain metadata which could allow
an unauthorized third party to reconstruct PHI data that was deleted from the message.
The clinic should implement a policy where users must not reply directly to any received
emails containing PHI. Clinic personnel should create a new email message with no PHI
in it to send and ensure that all outgoing messages have a legal disclaimer at the
bottom of the email that absolves the clinic of liability for any PHI received. The clinic
should also implement an email retention policy based on the knowledge that client PHI
may exist in a mailbox folder and should be deleted within a set timeframe.
Clinic A must conduct due diligence to understand and document how the CSP is
handling PHI. While these risks were transferred to the CSP for its day-to-day
management, it is still the responsibility of the clinic to ensure the CSP is compliant with
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HIPAA requirements on a periodic basis. They should verify the existence of any
security certification the CSP holds i.e. a service organization controls (SOC) standard.
Such certifications clearly communicate the standards of compliance that exist in the
CSP environment. They should also check with the CSP regarding specific security
measures that are in place, including encryption procedures, backup procedures, and
which business associates have access to PHI. Encryption includes data at rest and in
transit. Each of these answers should be documented and periodically re-checked by
the clinic during annual reviews or risk assessments.
Gaps: Clinic B. There were many gaps within Clinic B that were of a more
serious nature than the ones identified within Clinic A. Clinic B lacked a competent
management approach which protected the security of PHI. The lone server which ran
EagleSoft was a low-maintenance option to keep the business running, but it was a
single point of failure that would be costly for the business when it inevitably fails. Its
location at the front of the office under the desk was in too open of an area. Additionally,
the external hard drive used to back up PHI was located on the front desk near the
server for convenience. Securing the external hard drive and moving the server to a
more secure location are critical steps that need to occur in short order.
Encrypting data at rest was another critical gap in Clinic B. While EagleSoft had
an encryption feature in its current version for data stored on the server, this was not
manually implemented by the owner. EagleSoft encrypts its communications between
its client program and server calls over the internet. PHI data backed up to the cloud
and the external hard drive were not encrypted at rest. The owner used a VPN to
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transfer the data, which implies it was encrypted in transit. The owner originally used
two backup sources because of the perceived unreliability of the cloud when first
deploying the solution several years ago. The cloud backup provider was not HIPAAcompliant, so they need to either choose an appropriate HIPAA-compliant solution with
that provider or find a new provider. The owner stayed with this backup provider
because it was a free solution. Off-site backups had not been tested and the owner did
not have a process in place for maintaining PHI based on HIPAA requirements.
The BAAs with EagleSoft, the cloud backup provider, and other vendors with PHI
access need to be reviewed, and in certain cases remediated, to comply with HIPAA
requirements. A contingency plan and disaster recovery plan need to be created which
address the single point of failure gap for the server containing PHI.
Another gap was logon monitoring. Clinic B did not monitor logons on its devices
and the owner did not know to what extent EagleSoft monitored the logons within its
interface. This is an area to follow up and document accordingly with the vendor.
The remediation of each of these gaps needs to be documented clearly so that
the next iteration of risk assessment for Clinic B can focus more granularly on other
core items within the SRA tool.
Comparative Analysis: Cloud vs. On-Premises. By operating in a Softwareas-a-Service (SaaS) model, Clinic A transferred the risks of managing PHI encryption,
backups, and server redundancy to the CSP. Should a healthcare provider have an
interest in managing their own HIPAA-compliant on-premises IT environment, there are
several focal points to consider. The advantages of an on-premises setup may include
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greater autonomy, lower costs, and a lack of reliance on the internet to do business.
Rural areas without high-speed internet may benefit less from the cloud services model.
More time will be required to manage an on-premises environment due to the added
complexity; this could also be transferred to an IT contractor or managed services
provider, which would add to the cost.
The advantages of using the cloud option are greater simplicity and less
overhead for the small business. Particularly for non-tech-savvy small business owners,
this may be the ideal option. In spite of these benefits, businesses still must conduct
due diligence on the CSP for HIPAA compliance, manage the local IT environment
effectively, and understand that their business depends on a reliable internet
connection. Poor security practices will negate many of the benefits that the cloud
provides and potentially result in HIPAA fines.
An additional option to consider is a hybrid cloud deployment, using Clinic B as
an example. In one scenario, Clinic B continues to run its primary systems in a modified
HIPAA-compliant setup that uses the cloud for failover purposes. The second scenario
uses the cloud for primary business functionality and Clinic B maintains its current
infrastructure while making appropriate improvements in the event of a cloud or internet
failure. The latter might be the most cost-effective option with the costs of operating in a
HIPAA-compliant cloud being fairly reasonable. One of the key considerations to this
equation is that the clinic owner has a reasonable base of IT knowledge which can be
leveraged in a hybrid solution to improve business margins, should there ever be an
internet or cloud outage. This is an important distinction compared with someone who
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has little knowledge or interest in IT and outsources the IT-related tasks to a contractor.
Another way to frame this is that it is a time vs. money trade-off, with a central question
being to what degree a business has an interest in investing time in its IT infrastructure.
Summary
This chapter extensively covered the data collected from each case study,
analyzed the security gaps within each clinic, and offered a comparative analysis of IT
deployment options based on the risk assessment results.
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Chapter V: Discussion, Future Work, and Conclusion
Introduction
This chapter includes a discussion of recent cyberattack data involving small
businesses, the evolving regulatory landscape, contract caveats, and a further analysis
of maturity in the HIPAA context. Numerous areas are identified where future work can
build upon the current body of knowledge. It concludes with a summary of the
contributions of this work and a final comment on the use of the cloud vs. on-premises
solutions.
Discussion
Recent data suggests that only one in four small businesses are well-prepared
for a cyberattack (William, 2017) and that 43% of attacks targeted small businesses in
2015, up 25% from 2011. (Sophy, 2016) Furthermore, 60% of small businesses that
suffer cyberattacks go out of business within six months. (Miller, 2016) This suggests
that currently there is significant opportunity to assist small businesses with improving
their security posture and mitigating risks. While these numbers may not be precisely
mirrored in the healthcare sector, it is not far-fetched to think that many small healthcare
organizations would be crippled by a targeted attack and generally need greater
attention placed on their security program.
From a regulatory perspective, the financial incentives continue to shift towards
compliance. Growing HIPAA fines, usually after breaches, continue to receive
widespread attention. Morrissey (2017) noted that the Medicare Access and Children’s
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 added an additional layer of
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financial incentives for healthcare providers to prioritize security. Providers who are
audited and cannot show documentation of security risk assessments now face a
resultant 25% reduction in Medicare reimbursements; if providers are found to have lied
about compliance, they are liable to incur at least a five-figure fine. A 25% Medicare
reimbursement reduction is a significant incentive for providers who are heavily reliant
on these payments. If this requirement continues to be enforced on a broader scale, it
may create a larger shift in the approaches of healthcare organizations towards more
resilient cyber security practices.
Contract liability is an additional point of emphasis for both clinics. HIPAAcompliant BAAs need to be put in place with new or existing vendors that deal directly
with PHI, and periodic audits of BAAs are needed. Healthcare Risk Management (2017)
advised that using BAAs for vendors that do not deal with PHI introduces ambiguity with
regards to HIPAA regulations. They indicate that it is worth spending time and possibly
consulting with an attorney to ensure appropriate BAAs include provisions which are
reasonable or favorable. Note that an industry standard that is universally amenable for
both parties has yet to emerge. This implies that third-party risk could be a business
backbreaker and needs to be given high priority within the security plan.
The maturity of a security program is important to consider when determining
how to interpret the results of a risk assessment, with the understanding that risk
assessments are an iterative process. It may not be realistic for a small clinic to make a
significant jump in its security posture after the first assessment. The signals from HHS
are that it wants to see commitment and progress in this realm. If a healthcare provider
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can demonstrate that it has taken definitive steps forward with its security program, this
can help to avoid or reduce fines that would result from a breach or random audit. Clinic
B is on a very basic level of maturity and would need to approach its next iteration quite
differently than Clinic A, which is perhaps a level or two higher on the 1-5 maturity scale
(Veltsos, 2016).
Future Work
There are many areas where future work can occur. A closer evaluation of the
factors from a security standpoint that distinguish small from medium-sized practices
would help streamline the learning curve for healthcare providers and empower small
providers to maintain a growth mindset with respect to these compliance obligations. An
important component to note about this work is that the SRA tool is geared specifically
for HIPAA Security Rule compliance, which is a subset of HIPAA compliance. Future
work could integrate this risk assessment process within the HIPAA Security Rule with
other HIPAA compliance requirements i.e. the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Many of these
requirements are less complex than what has been undertaken in this work, yet a
holistic overall solution would be most beneficial and practical for healthcare providers
to further streamline their compliance processes.
Exploring the knowledge and priority gaps between small healthcare providers
could also provide valuable insight into the thinking behind what exists in practice. A
well-formulated query of providers could further elicit their needs without causing undue
risk about sharing what is likely a weak cyber risk posture in many cases.
Another angle for future consideration is how to improve the experience of using
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the SRA tool. The SRA tool is essentially a spreadsheet that does nothing to intelligently
automate the output. Integrating the SRA tool with an orchestration technology would
give the data more value in an automated workflow. Alternately, the SRA tool could
integrate with machine learning technology to take the input from a healthcare provider
directly and return output which is relevant and actionable for the business.
The HITRUST CTX partnership with Trend Micro is an important opportunity for
healthcare providers to improve the maturity of their threat intelligence capabilities.
(HITRUST, 2017) This information sharing opportunity is free to join and future work
could deploy this functionality in a small clinical setting to demonstrate the value of the
evolving information sharing capabilities for small healthcare providers as a
complementary component of a resilient security program.
Contract liability seems to be an area of great opportunities and challenges.
Future work could emphasize a deep dive into the dynamics of all perspectives involved
in the third-party contractor risk problem and offer targeted analysis which can drive
forward a solution that works for all parties. Such work would give small healthcare
providers greater clarity and confidence to negotiate BAAs that maintain the resilience
of their cyber risk posture.
Conclusion
While not a one-size-fits-all solution, the SRA tool effectively provided an
overarching context to conduct HIPAA security risk assessments. The data from both
case studies reveals the depth and breadth of knowledge required to effectively assess
the cyber risk posture of these organizations. Risk assessments are a serious
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undertaking and require a full commitment from the organization to meet HIPAA
requirements. Even small healthcare providers are required to safeguard the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI data. Regardless of who contracts with
them as a service provider, these organizations own the requirements for HIPAA
compliance. Therefore, it is critical that appropriate documentation and BAAs be in
place to protect from this growing avenue of risk. Common sense cyber security
measures must be followed for other efforts, such as safeguarding PHI using a CSP, to
succeed.
Clinic A showed a higher level of maturity than Clinic B by reporting answers that
had a high degree of compliance. However, both clinics must add significant
documentation to demonstrate compliance in many areas identified by the SRA tool
questionnaire. Clinic B had several critical areas to remediate in short order, or else it
risks getting caught flat-footed when a breach or other disaster occurs.
The data also provided a window into the two approaches used by these clinics:
housing PHI in the cloud vs. on-premises. The cloud is an ideal solution in many ways,
and it is cost-effective for businesses that have access to high-speed internet. An onpremises solution is preferable for entities who prefer a more hands-on approach, or
perhaps do not want their business to rely on an internet connection. A hybrid cloud
option may be preferable in many cases, which can offer the best of both worlds with a
modest level of time investment from the business. This ultimately makes whether, and
to what degree, to use the cloud a subjective question.
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Appendix: SRA Tool Questions
Administrative Safeguards


A1 - §164.308(a)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice develop, document, and
implement policies and procedures for assessing and managing risk to its
electronic protected health information (ePHI)?



A2 - §164.308(a)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice have a process for
periodically reviewing its risk analysis policies and procedures and making
updates as necessary?



A3 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Required Does your practice categorize its
information systems based on the potential impact to your practice should they
become unavailable?



A4 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Required Does your practice periodically complete an
accurate and thorough risk analysis, such as upon occurrence of a significant
event or change in your business organization or environment?



A5 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice have a formal
documented program to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities to ePHI identified
through the risk analysis?



A6 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice assure that its risk
management program prevents against the impermissible use and disclosure of
ePHI?



A7 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice document the results of
its risk analysis and assure the results are distributed to appropriate members of
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the workforce who are responsible for mitigating the threats and vulnerabilities to
ePHI identified through the risk analysis?


A8 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice formally document a
security plan?



A9 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) Required Does your practice have a formal and
documented process or regular human resources policy to discipline workforce
members who have access to your organization’s ePHI if they are found to have
violated the office’s policies to prevent system misuse, abuse, and any harmful
activities that involve your practice's ePHI?



A10 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) Required Does your practice include its sanction
policies and procedures as part of its security awareness and training program
for all workforce members?



A11 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures for the review of information system activity?



A12 - §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Required Does your practice regularly review
information system activity?



A13 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Does your practice have a senior-level person
whose job it is to develop and implement security policies and procedures or act
as a security point of contact?



A14 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Is your practice’s security point of contact
qualified to assess its security protections as well as serve as the point of contact
for security policies, procedures, monitoring, and training?
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A15 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Does your practice have a job description for its
security point of contact that includes that person's duties, authority, and
accountability?



A16 - §164.308(a)(2) Required Does your practice make sure that its workforce
members and others with authorized access to your ePHI know the name and
contact information for its security point of contact and know to contact this
person if there are any security problems?



A17 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice have a list that includes all
members of its workforce, the roles assigned to each, and the corresponding
access that each role enables for your practice’s facilities, information systems,
electronic devices, and ePHI?



A18 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice know all business
associates and the access that each requires for your practice’s facilities,
information systems, electronic devices, and ePHI?



A19 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice clearly define roles and
responsibilities along logical lines and assures that no one person has too much
authority for determining who can access your practice's facilities, information
systems, and ePHI?



A20 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures that make sure those who need access to ePHI have access and
those who do not are denied such access?
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A21 - §164.308(a)(3)(i) Required Has your practice chosen someone whose job
duty is to decide who can access ePHI (and under what conditions) and to create
ePHI access rules that others can follow?



A22 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Does your practice define roles and job
duties for all job functions and keep written job descriptions that clearly set forth
the qualifications?



A23 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Does your practice have policies and
procedures for access authorization that support segregation of duties?



A24 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Does your practice implement
procedures for authorizing users and changing authorization permissions?



A25 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Addressable Do your practice’s policies and
procedures for access authorization address the needs of those who are not
members of its workforce?



A26 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B) Addressable Does your organization have policies
and procedures that authorize members of your workforce to have access to
ePHI and describe the types of access that are permitted?



A27 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B) Addressable Do your practice’s policies and
procedures require screening workforce members prior to enabling access to its
facilities, information systems, and ePHI to verify that users are trustworthy?



A28 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice have policies and
procedures for terminating authorized access to its facilities, information systems,
and ePHI once the need for access no longer exists?
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A29 - §164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice have formal policies
and policies and procedures to support when a workforce member’s employment
is terminated and/or a relationship with a business associate is terminated?



A30 - §164.308(a)(4)(i) Standard Do your practice’s policies and procedures
describe the methods it uses to limit access to its ePHI?



A31 - §164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) Does your practice have policies and procedures that
explain how it grants access to ePHI to its workforce members and to other
entities (business associates)?



A32 - §164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C) Addressable Do the roles and responsibilities
assigned to your practice’s workforce members support and enforce segregation
of duties?



A33 - §164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice’s policies and
procedures explain how your practice assigns user authorizations (privileges),
including the access that are permitted?



A34 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice have a training program
that makes each individual with access to ePHI aware of security measures to
reduce the risk of improper access, uses, and disclosures?



A35 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice periodically review and
update its security awareness and training program in response to changes in
your organization, facilities or environment?



A36 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice provide ongoing basic
security awareness to all workforce members, including physicians?
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A37 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice provide role-based training
to all new workforce members?



A38 - §164.308(a)(5)(i) Standard Does your practice keep records that detail
when each workforce member satisfactorily completed periodic training?



A39 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A) Addressable As part of your practice’s ongoing
security awareness activities, does your practice prepare and communicate
periodic security reminders to communicate about new or important issues?



A40 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Addressable Does your practice’s awareness and
training content include information about the importance of implementing
software patches and updating antivirus software when requested?



A41 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Addressable Does your practice’s awareness and
training content include information about how malware can get into your
systems?



A42 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Addressable Does your practice include log-in
monitoring as part of its awareness and training programs?



A43 - §164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Addressable Does your practice include password
management as part of its awareness and training programs?



A44 - §164.308(a)(6)(i) Standard Does your practice have policies and
procedures designed to help prevent, detect and respond to security incidents?



A45 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice have incident response
policies and procedures that assign roles and responsibilities for incident
response?
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A46 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice identify members of its
incident response team and assure workforce members are trained and that
incident response plans are tested?



A47 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice’s incident response plan
align with its emergency operations and contingency plan, especially when it
comes to prioritizing system recovery actions or events to restore key processes,
systems, applications, electronic device and media, and information (such as
ePHI)?



A48 - §164.308(a)(6)(ii) Required Does your practice implement the information
system’s security protection tools to protect against malware?



A49 - §164.308(a)(7)(i) Standard Does your practice know what critical services
and ePHI it must have available to support decision making about a patient’s
treatment during an emergency?



A50 - §164.308(a)(7)(i) Standard Does your practice consider how natural or
man-made disasters could damage its information systems or prevent access to
ePHI and develop policies and procedures for responding to such a situation?



A51 - §164.308(a)(7)(i) Standard Does your practice regularly review/update its
contingency plan as appropriate?



A52 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures for the creation and secure storage of an electronic copy of ePHI that
would be used in the case of system breakdown or disaster?
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A53 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures for contingency plans to provide access to ePHI to continue
operations after a natural or human-made disaster?



A54 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C) Required Does your practice have an emergency
mode operations plan to ensure the continuation of critical business processes
that must occur to protect the availability and security of ePHI immediately after a
crisis situation?



A55 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D) Addressable Does your practice have policies and
procedures for testing its contingency plans on a periodic basis?



A56 - §164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E) Addressable Does your practice implement
procedures for identifying and assessing the criticality of its information system
applications and the storage of data containing ePHI that would be accessed
through the implementation of its contingency plans?



A57 - §164.308(a)(8) Standard Does your practice maintain and implement
policies and procedures for assessing risk to ePHI and engaging in a periodic
technical and non-technical evaluation in response to environmental or
operational changes affecting the security of your practice’s ePHI?



A58 - §164.308(a)(8) Standard Does your practice periodically monitor its
physical environment, business operations, and information system to gauge the
effectiveness of security safeguards?
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A59 - §164.308(a)(8) Standard Does your practice identify the role responsible
and accountable for assessing risk and engaging in ongoing evaluation,
monitoring, and reporting?



A60 - §164.308(b)(1) Standard Does your practice identify the role responsible
and accountable for making sure that business associate agreements are in
place before your practice enables a service provider to begin to create, access,
store or transmit ePHI on your behalf?



A61 - §164.308(b)(1) Standard Does your practice maintain a list of all of its
service providers, indicating which have access to your practice’s facilities,
information systems and ePHI?



A62 - §164.308(b)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and implement
procedures to assure it obtains business associate agreements?



A63 - §164.308(b)(2) Required If your practice is the business associate of
another covered entity and your practice has subcontractors performing activities
to help carry out the activities that you have agreed to carry out for the other
covered entity that involve ePHI, does your practice require these subcontractors
to provide satisfactory assurances for the protection of the ePHI?



A64 - §164.308(b)(3) Required Does your practice execute business associate
agreements when it has a contractor creating, transmitting or storing ePHI?



O1 - §164.314(a)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice assure that its business
associate agreements include satisfactory assurances for safeguarding ePHI?
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O2 - §164.314(a)(2)(i) Required Do the terms and conditions of your practice’s
business associate agreements state that the business associate will implement
appropriate security safeguards to protect the privacy, confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of ePHI that it collects, creates, maintains, or transmits on behalf
of the practice and timely report security incidents to your practice?



O3 - §164.314(a)(2)(iii) Required If your practice is the business associate of a
covered entity do the terms and conditions of your practice’s business associate
agreements state that your subcontractor (business associate) will implement
appropriate security safeguards to protect the privacy, confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of ePHI that it collects, creates, maintains, or transmits on behalf
of the covered entity?



PO1 -§164.316(a) Standard Do your practice’s processes enable the
development and maintenance of policies and procedures that implement risk
analysis, informed risk-based decision making for security risk mitigation, and
effective mitigation and monitoring that protects the privacy, confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of ePHI?



PO2 - §164.316(b)(1)(i) Standard Does your practice assure that its policies and
procedures are maintained in a manner consistent with other business records?



PO3 - §164.316(b)(1)(ii) Standard Does your practice assure that its other
security program documentation is maintained in written manuals or in electronic
form?
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PO4 - §164.316(b)(2)(i) Required Does your practice assure that its policies,
procedures, and other security program documentation are retained for at least
six (6) years from the date when it was created or last in effect, whichever is
longer?



PO5 - §164.316(b)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice assure that its policies,
procedures and other security program documentation are available to those who
need it to perform the responsibilities associated with their role?



PO6 - §164.316(b)(2)(iii) Required Does your practice assure that it periodically
reviews and updates (when needed) its policies, procedures, and other security
program documentation?

Technical Safeguards


T1 - §164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
requiring safeguards to limit access to ePHI to those persons and software
programs appropriate for their role?



T2 - § 164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
to grant access to ePHI based on the person or software programs appropriate
for their role?



T3 - §164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice analyze the activities
performed by all of its workforce and service providers to identify the extent to
which each needs access to ePHI?



T4 - §164.312(a)(1) Standard Does your practice identify the security settings for
each of its information systems and electronic devices that control access?
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T5 - §164.312(a)(2)(i) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures for the assignment of a unique identifier for each authorized user?



T6 - §164.312(a)(2)(i) Required Does your practice require that each user enter
a unique user identifier prior to obtaining access to ePHI?



T7 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures to enable access to ePHI in the event of an emergency?



T8 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice define what constitutes an
emergency and identify the various types of emergencies that are likely to occur?



T9 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures for creating an exact copy of ePHI as a backup?



T10 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice back up ePHI by saving an
exact copy to a magnetic disk/tape or a virtual storage, such as a cloud
environment?



T11 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have back up information
systems so that it can access ePHI in the event of an emergency or when your
practice’s primary systems become unavailable?



T12 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have the capability to
activate emergency access to its information systems in the event of a disaster?



T13 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice have policies and
procedures to identify the role of the individual accountable for activating
emergency access settings when necessary?
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T14 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice designate a workforce
member who can activate the emergency access settings for your information
systems?



T15 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice test access when
evaluating its ability to continue accessing ePHI and other health records during
an emergency?



T16 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Required Does your practice effectively recover from an
emergency and resume normal operations and access to ePHI?



T17 - §164.312(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Does your practice have policies and
procedures that require an authorized user’s session to be automatically loggedoff after a predetermined period of inactivity?



T18 - §164.312(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Does a responsible person in your
practice know the automatic logoff settings for its information systems and
electronic devices?



T19 - §164.312(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Does your practice activate an automatic
logoff that terminates an electronic session after a predetermined period of user
inactivity?



T20 - §164.312(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your practice have policies and
procedures for implementing mechanisms that can encrypt and decrypt ePHI?



T21 - §164.312(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your practice know the encryption
capabilities of its information systems and electronic devices?
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T22 - §164.312(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your practice control access to ePHI
and other health information by using encryption/decryption methods to deny
access to unauthorized users?



T23 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
identifying hardware, software, or procedural mechanisms that record or examine
information systems activities?



T24 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice identify its activities that create,
store, and transmit ePHI and the information systems that support these
business processes?



T25 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice categorize its activities and
information systems that create, transmit or store ePHI as high, moderate or low
risk based on its risk analyses?



T26 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice use the evaluation from its risk
analysis to help determine the frequency and scope of its audits, when identifying
the activities that will be tracked?



T27 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have audit control mechanisms
that can monitor, record and/or examine information system activity?



T28 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
for creating, retaining, and distributing audit reports to appropriate workforce
members for review?



T29 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice generate the audit reports and
distribute them to the appropriate people for review?
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T30 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
establishing retention requirements for audit purposes?



T31 - §164.312(b) Standard Does your practice retain copies of its audit/access
records?



T32 - §164.312(c)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
for protecting ePHI from unauthorized modification or destruction?



T33 - §164.312(c)(2) Addressable Does your practice have mechanisms to
corroborate that ePHI has not been altered, modified or destroyed in an
unauthorized manner?



T34 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice have policies and procedures
for verification of a person or entity seeking access to ePHI is the one claimed?



T35 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice know the authentication
capabilities of its information systems and electronic devices to assure that a
uniquely identified user is the one claimed?



T36 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice use the evaluation from its risk
analysis to select the appropriate authentication mechanism?



T37 - §164.312(d) Required Does your practice protect the confidentiality of the
documentation containing access control records (list of authorized users and
passwords)?



T38 - §164.312(e)(1) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
for guarding against unauthorized access of ePHI when it is transmitted on an
electronic network?
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T39 - §164.312(e)(1) Standard Do your practice implement safeguards, to
assure that ePHI is not accessed while en-route to its intended recipient?



T40 - §164.312(e)(2)(i) Addressable Does your practice know what encryption
capabilities are available to it for encrypting ePHI being transmitted from one
point to another?



T41 - §164.312(e)(2)(i) Addressable Does your practice take steps to reduce
the risk that ePHI can be intercepted or modified when it is being sent
electronically?



T42 - §164.312(e)(2)(i) Addressable Does your practice implement encryption
as the safeguard to assure that ePHI is not compromised when being transmitted
from one point to another?



T44 - §164.312(e)(2)(ii) Addressable Does your practice have policies and
procedures for encrypting ePHI when deemed reasonable and appropriate?



T45 - §164.312(e)(2)(ii) Addressable When analyzing risk, does your practice
consider the value of encryption for assuring the integrity of ePHI is not accessed
or modified when it is stored or transmitted?

Physical Safeguards


PH1 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have an inventory of the physical
systems, devices, and media in your office space that are used to store or
contain ePHI?
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PH2 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have policies and procedures for the
physical protection of your facilities and equipment? This includes controlling the
environment inside the facility.



PH3 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have policies and procedures for the
physical protection of your facilities and equipment? This includes controlling the
environment inside the facility.



PH4 - §164.310(a)(1) Standard Do you have physical protections in place to
manage physical security risks, such as a) locks on doors and windows and b)
cameras in nonpublic areas to monitor all entrances and exits?



PH5 - §164.310(a)(2)(i) Addressable Do you plan and coordinate physical
(facilities) and technical (information systems, mobile devices, or workstations)
security-related activities (such as testing) before doing such activities to reduce
the impact on your practice assets and individuals?



PH6 - §164.310(a)(2)(i) Addressable Have you developed policies and
procedures that plan for your workforce (and your information technology service
provider or contracted information technology support) to gain access to your
facility and its ePHI during a disaster?



PH7 - §164.310(a)(2)(i) Addressable If a disaster happens, does your practice
have another way to get into your facility or offsite storage location to get your
ePHI?



PH8 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you have policies and procedures for
the protection of keys, combinations, and similar physical access controls?
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PH9 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you have policies and procedures
governing when to re-key locks or change combinations when, for example, a
key is lost, a combination is compromised, or a workforce member is transferred
or terminated?



PH10 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you have a written facility security
plan?



PH11 - §164.310(a)(2)(ii) Addressable Do you take the steps necessary to
implement your facility security plan?



PH12 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you have a Facility User Access List
of workforce members, business associates, and others who are authorized to
access your facilities where ePHI and related information systems are located?



PH13 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you periodically review and approve
a Facility User Access List and authorization privileges, removing from the
Access List personnel no longer requiring access?



PH14 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Does your practice have procedures to
control and validate someone’s access to your facilities based on that person’s
role or job duties?



PH15 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you have procedures to create,
maintain, and keep a log of who accesses your facilities (including visitors), when
the access occurred, and the reason for the access?
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PH16 - §164.310(a)(2)(iii) Addressable Has your practice determined whether
monitoring equipment is needed to enforce your facility access control policies
and procedures?



PH17 - §164.310(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Do you have maintenance records that
include the history of physical changes, upgrades, and other modifications for
your facilities and the rooms where information systems and ePHI are kept?



PH18 - §164.310(a)(2)(iv) Addressable Do you have a process to document the
repairs and modifications made to the physical security features that protect the
facility, administrative offices, and treatment areas?



PH19 - §164.310(b) Standard Does your practice keep an inventory and a
location record of all of its workstation devices?



PH20 - §164.310(b) Standard Has your practice developed and implemented
workstation use policies and procedures?



PH21 - §164.310(b) Standard Has your practice documented how staff,
employees, workforce members, and non-employees access your workstations?



PH22 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
that describe how to prevent unauthorized access of unattended workstations?



PH23 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have policies and procedures
that describe how to position workstations to limit the ability of unauthorized
individuals to view ePHI?



PH24 - §164.310(c) Standard Have you put any of your practice's workstations
in public areas?
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PH25 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice use laptops and tablets as
workstations? If so, does your practice have specific policies and procedures to
safeguard these workstations?



PH26 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have physical protections in
place to secure your workstations?



PH27 - §164.310(c) Standard Do you regularly review your workstations’
locations to see which areas are more vulnerable to unauthorized use, theft, or
viewing of the data?



PH28 - §164.310(c) Standard Does your practice have physical protections and
other security measures to reduce the chance for inappropriate access of ePHI
through workstations? This could include using locked doors, screen barriers,
cameras, and guards.



PH29 - §164.310(c) Standard Do your policies and procedures set standards for
workstations that are allowed to be used outside of your facility?



PH30 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Does your practice have security policies and
procedures to physically protect and securely store electronic devices and media
inside your facility(ies) until they can be securely disposed of or destroyed?



PH31 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Do you remove or destroy ePHI from
information technology devices and media prior to disposal of the device?



PH32 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Do you maintain records of the movement of
electronic devices and media inside your facility?
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PH33 - §164.310(d)(1) Standard Have you developed and implemented policies
and procedures that specify how your practice should dispose of electronic
devices and media containing ePHI?



PH34 - §164.310(d)(2)(i) Required Do you require that all ePHI is removed from
equipment and media before you remove the equipment or media from your
facilities for offsite maintenance or disposal?



PH35 - §164.310(d)(2)(ii) Required Do you have procedures that describe how
your practice should remove ePHI from its storage media/ electronic devices
before the media is re-used?



PH36 - §164.310(d)(2)(iii) Addressable Does your practice maintain a record of
movements of hardware and media and the person responsible for the use and
security of the devices or media containing ePHI outside the facility?



PH37 - §164.310(d)(2)(iii) Addressable Do you maintain records of employees
removing electronic devices and media from your facility that has or can be used
to access ePHI?



PH38 - §164.310(d)(2)(iv) Addressable Does your organization create backup
files prior to the movement of equipment or media to ensure that data is available
when it is needed?

